Recession History
The widely-watched unemployment rate, released the first Friday of
each month, turns out to be a lagging indicator of economic recovery
and stock market profits. On the surface, that seems illogical. How
can companies (and their investors) profit while more Americans are
saving, scrimping and job-hunting rather than trolling shopping
malls, traveling, fueling a consumer-based recovery? But on second
look, it makes sense that earnings can rise handsomely when staff
counts are at their leanest and most efficient. As soon as bad job
news starts looking a little less bad (as happened in March), stocks
can begin their long-awaited rebirth.
When I look at the last six official recessions, this pattern comes
clear. A generation ago, we had four deep recessions in the
stagflation era (1970 to 1982), in which the peak jobless rate
lagged the stock market’s bottom by 4-7 months. Then, we experienced
two softer recessions in the goldilocks era, with a longer time lag,
but in each case the stock market recovery began several months
before the unemployment rate peaked.
| Market bottom |
Recession Ends* |
Jobless peak |
(Peak rate) |
Months (Lag) |
| May 26, 1970 |
November, 1970 |
Dec, 1970 |
(6.1%) |
7 |
| October 3, 1974 |
March, 1975 |
May, 1975 |
(9.0%) |
7 |
| March 27, 1980 |
July, 1980 |
July, 1980 |
(7.8%) |
4 |
| August 12, 1982 |
November, 1982 |
Dec., 1982 |
(10.8%) |
4 |
| October 11, 1990 |
March, 1991 |
June, 1992 |
(7.8%) |
20 |
| October 9, 2002 |
November, 2001 |
June, 2003 |
(6.3%) |
9 |
| March 9, 2009 |
Mid-2009 ** |
Late 2009 ** |
(?? 10%) ** |
|
*According to the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER).
** My simple estimate, based on speculation and historic patterns,
nothing more.
The median lag time from market bottom to jobless peak is about
seven months, with the odd outlier in 1992 thanks to campaign
slogans like “the jobless recovery” and “it’s the economy, stupid.”
Otherwise, the lag-time averages closer to six months. If history is
any guide here, we should see a jobless peak in the fall of 2009 at
about 10%, with the end of the recession coming slightly before that
– by this summer. This is all speculation of course.
The end of the recession usually comes before the peak in jobless
rates, since companies seldom re-hire until the chances of recovery
seem fairly clear from other data. This current recession officially
began in December, 2007. No post-World War II recession has lasted
longer than 16 months until this one, so the 2008-9 market crash and
recession already represent the roughest recession since 1981-82 and
the worst stock market crash since 1929-32. Today’s 9.4%
unemployment rate is already the worst since 1983.
Many economists feel that the pace of new jobless filings is
decreasing substantially: May payrolls fell by 345,000, which was
much better than the consensus expectation of 520,000 jobs lost.
This was the first time in six months that monthly job losses were
less than half a million. But since the labor force grew
substantially in May, the jobless rate soared 0.5% to 9.4%, tying
the record for the largest monthly leap since 1975. This sounds
strange – new jobless filings falling while the jobless rate soars –
but the jobless rate is based on how many people are
LOOKING
for work and can’t find it, so if more Americans come out of their
jobless funk and start shopping for jobs, that’s a good sign – even
though it sends the jobless rate up. These people are typically more
confident about finding a job.
At this point, it’s worth a minute to compare the two major job
surveys, since their data often conflict:
(1)
Payrolls: The Current Employment Statistics (or “Payroll
Survey”) contacts 160,000 businesses at 400,000 locations, reporting
trends of hiring and firing in non-farm, non-supervisory jobs, so it
only measures that part of the economy that is most sensitive to
corporate layoffs and hiring.
(2)
Households: The Current Population Survey (“Household
Survey”) contacts about 60,000 U.S. households, asking if the adults
there have a job or are looking for work. This survey is best for
measuring those self-employed and part-time workers who operate
outside the scope of company payrolls. This survey is also a
practical reflection of real-world situations, since it contains six
levels of unemployment, ranging from hard-core (jobless and looking
for work 15 weeks or longer) to semi-underemployed cases (part-time
workers looking for full-time work). The official unemployment rate
is currently 9.4%, but when you include part timers looking for full
time work it shoots up to 16.4%. This statistic started back in 1992
so it was not used during the 1982-1983 recession.
According to a May study by the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland,
the number of involuntary part-timers has increased by 4.9 million
in the past year, reaching 9.1 million in May. The dismal May
household survey also said that unemployment rose by 787,000 to 14.5
million in May, while 350,000 people joined the workforce, since
they felt better about the prospects for finding full-time work. As
bad as the current situation seems – especially to the 16.4% who are
unemployed or under-utilized – the situation was slightly worse in
1982 and far worse in 1932, when the official jobless rate was 25%,
but the estimates were that at least 50% of non-farm workers were in
the “part-time” category or worse. In other words, half of non-farm
Americans had only part-time work or none at all. In the 1930s,
rural farms were a much greater proportion of the economy, and
farmers were counted as employed, even if their farm was losing
money. As a result, the official national 25% unemployment rate in
1932-33 ballooned to a record 37% of non-farm workers – that’s
comparable to today’s non-farm payroll report – and the rate was far
worse in urban manufacturing regions. For instance, the jobless rate
reached 60% in Cleveland and 80% in Toledo.
President Hoover’s first response to the 1929 stock market crash was
to convene a series of conferences with industrial leaders in which
he exacted from them solemn promises not to cut wages; even to
increase them if possible – promises kept until 1932. The prevailing
economic theories of the day taught that high wages create
prosperity, so Hoover enforced stable-pay pledges. Sadly, that left
employers with no choice other than to fire workers. That's how
politicians think because they are motivated by votes, not reality.
If you ever get a chance to sit down and read a good book about the
depression years, I recommend "The Forgotten Man" by Amity Shlaes.
Later, Hoover and FDR cut their own pay along with the pay of
Congress and other federal employees by 15%, but they should have
allowed other Americans to work for 15% less, too. In a 20%
deflationary skid, earning 15% less makes you a net winner. As it
turned out, wages rose while jobs disappeared. The policy
implications for today’s legislators seem clear: Don’t overly meddle
in trying to provide short-term job security at the expense of
killing the inevitable recovery, which is now only a few months
away. Additionally, all politicians in Washington DC and at state
and local governments should take pay cuts of up to 25% until this
recession passes. Feel free to email your Congressperson and
Senator with that realistic request. Without a vibrant private
sector, the public sector (i.e. government) will not be funded.
Herein ends the history lesson of the day.